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1 Preface: Southern Europe Past and Present

In this volume of Berg’s “International Perspectives” series on contem
porary Europe, James Petras and James Kurth have brought together
social scientists from three continents to explore the evolution of the
Southern European political order. Petras and Kurth each represent dis
tinct traditions of social science. Petras practices a critical sociology
designed to investigate how ideological and economic interests are
refracted through politics. Previously known for his many studies of
Latin American politics and social structure, he has recently produced
critiques of Southern European socialism that have generated debates
from Madrid to Athens. Kurth is a poHtical scientist rooted in traditions
of historical sociology in the grand manner of Barrington Moore, Perry
Anderson, and Theda Skocpol. In search of the broad historical sweep,
the terrain of the middle and long duree, he pursues that elusive ideal
identified by E.H. Carr in What is History?: “. . . the more sociological
history becomes, and the more historical sociology becomes, the better
for both.”'
Kurth on Southern Europe

Kurth’s contributions to this volume make the case for studying modem
Southern Europe as a unit. Historically there have been many obstacles
to such a project. Most comparative social science in North America and
Western Europe has busied itself with North Atlantic, northern Euro
pean civilizations or, alternatively, the great powers of the twentieth
century; the U.S., France, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and occa
sionally China and Japan. In perpetuating the neglect of Southern
Europe as a unit of study, Anglo-Saxon social science hardly stands
alone. Southern Europeans themselves resist efforts at assimilating their
diverse nationalities and regions into a single whole and, moreover, have
a long, sometimes lively history of stressing the incompatibility of their
cultures. This resistance can be found at many levels: from popular wis1. Edward Hallett Carr, What is History? (New York, 1963), p. 84.
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dom such as the Portuguese aphorism that “De Espanha ni bom vento ni
bom casamento” (“From Spain, there is neither good wind nor good
marriage”); to government pronouncements such as Ohvares s reference
to the Portuguese as “canaille,” “rogues . . . who pay less in taxes than
any people in Europe”; to the bombast of nineteenth-century national
ists who blamed Spanish rule for most things retrograde, including “that
pompous and crippled style [with which] the flamboyant character of the
Spanish corrupted the simple elegance of Italian letters ; to modem ide
ologues of Hellenic revival who sometimes claimed filiation from a clas
sical tradition of Athenian liberty in contrast to the authoritarianism of
Rome from the Empire to the Holy See. Even with the region blanket
ed in fascism fifty years ago, Mussolini stiU saw fit to invade his ideolog
ical counterpart in Greece, Metaxas, while Portugal s Salazar harbored
deep suspicions of Franco and a revival of Spanish nationalism. At the
advanced date of 1992, Portugal denounced Spain for celebrating
Columbus without acknowledging the trailblazing accomplishments of
the Portuguese navigators of the fifteenth century, only the latest in a
long saga of mutual vituperation and recrimination.^
Looking beyond such skirmishing, Kurth indicates that the countries
of Southern Europe have more in common than just the legacies of
Roman imperial rule and submission to Habsburg domination. In the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, he suggests, the region shared a sim
ilar sequence of political development as well as a widespread backward
ness in agriculture and industry that effectively preserved a fossilized
social stmcture (see Appendix A). This came to be reflected in the ubiq
uity of so-called obsolete classes, most notably the persistence of landed
elite power in all but Greece until the contemporary epoch. Buttressed
by high tariff walls on agricultural goods imposed in the late nineteenth
century,^ and flanked by a bourgeoisie too terrified of working class and
2. For the Count-Duke of Olivares (1587-1645) on Portugal, J.H. Elliott, The CountDuke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline (New Haven, 1986), p. 527. For the
nineteenth-century quotation of the decline of Italian letters due to Spain, see Eric
Cochrane, Historians and Historiography in the Italian Renaissance (Chicago, 1985 [1981]), p.
X. For an example of Greek ideological resistance to Rome, see Michael Herzfeld, Ours
Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modem Greece (New York, 1986), p. 40.
Herzfeld notes tensions in the Greek tradition: on the one hand, seeking to be part of
Europe and embracing Rome against Slavic and Turkish despotism, and on the other,
appealing to the superiority of Hellenic ways over the rest of Europe. For the latest row
between Portugal and Spain, Alan Riding, Bedfellows with Spain, Lisbon won t cuddle.
New York Times, 14June 1992.
3. This interpretation is a type of Mediterranean Sammlungspolitik\ among one of its
many features, it includes the manner in which tariff policy led to a unity of agrarian and
industrial elites. In Spain, Catalan textile owners, with some support from their workers,
joined Andalusian and Castilian landlords in the cry for protectionism of industry and a
backward agriculture. In Italy, its tariff of 1888 brought together a bloc of textile owners.
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peasant insurgencies to challenge their preeminence, the landed elites
were prone to a reactionary resolution of the transition to the modern
world. While Kurth is himself less preoccupied with this aspect of
Southern Europe, the imperial policies of Spain, Portugal, and Ottoman
Turkey may have provided some of the foundations for this later out
come. The Spanish occupation of Italy from the sixteenth through the
eighteenth centuries strengthened sectors of the Italian aristocracy and
coopted urban ehtes as a counterweight to the fiercely independent and
often recalcitrant city-states of the Renaissance. During this period, the
secular decline of Italy’s urban economy, marked by a textile industry
overwhelmed by cheap Dutch, English, and French output, shattered
much of the mercantile bourgeoisie and left those in good standing con
tent with retreat into agrarian sources ofwealth.'* The power of the land
ed elite remained immense throughout the Italian peninsula long after
Spain’s departure: by the turn of the twentieth century, the Borghese
family owned nearly 85 square miles of land within and surrounding
Rome; in the province of Bologna, an important agricultural breadbas
ket, 200—300 landowners held two-thirds or 157,500 out of 232,500
acres of the prime land; and in Sicily nearly 800 landowners, two-thirds

Steel magnates, sugar beet refiners, and wheat growers. Tariffs on grain allowed large
landowners to store grain in the spring and force high prices on the peasantry in the fall
when the small landowner and landless laborer had depleted any stored foodstuffs. See
Michael Seidman, Workers against Work: Labor in Paris and Barcelona during the Popular Fronts
(Berkeley, 1991), p. 21, and Richard Webster, Industrial Imperialism in Italy 1908—1915
(Berkeley, 1975), pp. 15—16. In Greece, a bloc of large landowners from newly acquired
Thessaly entered the parliament in the 1880s and successfully clamored for a high tariff on
wheat imports. In 1884, the wheat tariff underwent a fivefold leap, those for industrial
products a tripling. The large landowner bloc in Greece overall had weaker historical roots
than their counterparts in the rest of Southern Europe and eventually lost most of their
land, although often with state compensation. See below, especially footnote six. Nicos
Mouzelis, Modem Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment (London, 1978), p. 164n. For addition
al background on Greek economic poHcy, see Mark Mazower, Greece and the Inter-war Eco
nomic Crisis (Oxford, 1991).
Tariff pohcy and Sammlungspolitik is a staple of German historiography. Helmut Bohme,
Deutschlands Weg zur Grossmacht: Studien zum Verhdltnis von Wirtschaft und Staat wahrend der
Reichsgrundungszeit 1848—1881 (1966) produced the classic study of how the protective tar
iff of 1879 represented a “refounding of the German Reich.” The term Sammlungspolitik’
stems, however, from the 1890s. In Bohme’s account, Rudolf Delbruck, the orchestrator
of Prussian economic poUcy, is elevated to an historical weight and stature closer to that of
Bismarck. See also the writings of H.- U. Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus (1969) and
The German Empire: 1871—1918 (Leamington Spa, 1985). For a critique of Sammlungspoli
tik, see Geoff Eley, “Sammlungspolitik, Social ImperiaHsm, and the Navy Law of 1898,” in
Geoff Eley, From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past (Boston, 1986) and
David Blackboum and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and
Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany (Oxford, 1984).
4. Stuart Woolf, A History of Italy, 1700-1860: The Social Constraints of Political Change
(New York, 1986), pp. 23-24.
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of whom were non-resident, possessed one-third of the island. In
Greece, Ottoman rule wedged into the social structure a tax farming
stratum of large landowners whose limited tenure and extravagant levies
gave way after independence (ca. 1820-1830) to a smaU-holder peasantry
subsequently preyed upon by new merchant intermediaries and extor
tionate usurers. The post-liberation disintegration of the Ottoman chijlik
system led to small-holder peasantries in Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia, a
stark contrast to the latifundista pattern of Southern (S. Italy, Spain, S.
Portugal), Central (Prussia, Poland, Hungary), and Eastern Europe (Rus
sia). Neither an impoverished microfundista nor a semi-feudal lati
fundista agriculture provided a social base ready to glide smoothly
toward bourgeois democracy.'’
Meanwhile, Portugal, the first and last of the European empires (out
lasting Spain’s by seven decades), fit the closest to Joseph Schumpeter s
classic description of modem imperiahsm as an outgrowth of atavistic mil
itary and aristocratic ehtes. ^XAith one out of five of its adult male popula
tion in the military and a feudal aristocracy in the South that owned latifundia on average 5,878 acres - some 2,500 times the median size of the
plots held by the peasantry of the nation’s North, Portugal possessed the
essential ingredients for combining imperial domination abroad with
repression at home. ^iVhile Greece and Italy failed in late bids for imperial
grandeur, the Iberian powers developed an imperialism that was almost
the negation of the standard core-periphery pattern of Great Britain,
France, Belgium, the United States, and Japan. This was most acute in
Portugal, an underdeveloped economy yoked to an imperial governing
order. Observing thirty years ago that “the pattern is the very reverse of
an imperial economy,’’ Perry Anderson reflected that in Portugal,
5. Data from Arno Mayer, The Persistence of the Old Regime (New York, 1981), pp.
30-31. Martin Clark, Modem Italy, 1871-1982 (London, 1984), pp. 13-19, gives a more
nuanced perspective on the range of land ownership patterns in Italy: the tenacity of the
small-holder in regions of Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, and Liguna, and the particular
prominence of latifundia in the South.
6. The small-holder pattern predominated in Greece, but some regions reverted to pre
vious configurations of land ownership. In Thessaly, reattached to Greece in the years fol
lowing the Congress of Berlin (1878) at a conference of ambassadors in Constantinople
(1881), native Greeks replaced the Turkish owners of huge estates {chijliks). They retained
their vast estates until 1917 when Venizelos imposed a major land reform. For discussions
of this process, see Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modem Greece (Cambridge, 1986), pp.
89—91, 100. Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1979 [1974]), pp.
387-394, and L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York, 1958), pp. 478-479.
As is tire case for the Enghsh civil war and the French revolution, the class bases of the
Greek struggle for independence have always been a focal point of historiographical
debate; see Clogg’s data disputing the view that its leadership came fiom a merchant class
background, p. 49. Cf Mouzelis, pp. 12-13, with his distinction between a radicalized,
pro-Enhghtenment diaspora bourgeoisie and a more traditionalist indigenous bourgeoisie.
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With the single exception of cotton for the textile industry, the classic colonial
absorption of raw materials for re-export as manufactured products, does not
occur. The balance is exactly opposite: quasi-raw material exports (cork,
wine, etc. - involving minimal technological intervention), manufactured
imports.^

As for Spain, despite having greater wealth than Portugal in the mod
ern epoch, it had a similar trade pattern in its relationship with other
industrial imperialisms. France, for instance, in 1935 produced 17 times
as much pig iron as Spain and over ten times more crude steel. Its wheat
yields were double those of Spain. Michael Seidman, in his innovative
study of Popular Front era Spain and France, points out that
The two countries developed the classic trading relation of an industrial to an
agrarian nation: the French exported manufactured goods, and the Spanish
shipped agricultural products. In 1934, the largest French exports to Spain
were in order of importance, automobiles and parts, other motor vehicles,
silk, iron and steel, and chemical products. Spain sent to France fruits, sulphur,
wine, lead, and fresh vegetables.®

In Kurth’s own inteqjretation of Southern Europe, the first significant
divergence in modern pohtics between the Iberian peninsula on the one
hand and the Greek and Itahan nations on the other came in the region’s
encounter with a new imperial order, the pax Americana imposed in the
aftermath of World War II. While Iberian authoritarianism survived into
the 1970s, Greece and Italy witnessed the triumph of parliamentarism
under the new conditions set by Allied occupation.
Barrington Moore was once asked to explain why he thought social
revolutions were a likely prerequisite for the triumph of bourgeois
democracy. After all, it had been objected that West Germany and Japan
apparently made the transition to parliamentarism in peaceful conditions
following World War II. In Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery
(1970), he called the Allied occupation a form of“ersatz revolution.” For
7. Perry Anderson, “Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism,” New Left Review,
May-June 1962, p. 86. This also includes the data cited above on land distribution in Por
tugal. The observation on Portugal and Schumpeter’s theory, as well as the estimate of
male participation in the mibtary, comes from Fred HaUiday, “Portugal: Atlantic connec
tion,” New Statesman and Society, 22 May 1992, p. 25. For more detailed data on the com
position of the military that may slightly modify HaUiday’s estimate, see Kenneth Maxwell,
“Regime Overthrow and the Prospects for Democratic Transition in Portugal,” in Guiller
mo O’DonneU, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authori
tarian Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore, 1986), p. 110. He writes: “In 1974... one out of
four men of military age was in the armed forces.... The armed forces represented (at a low
estimate) a proportion per 1,000 of the population (30.83) exceeded only by Israel (40.09),
and North and South Vietnam (respectively 31.63, 55.36); five times that of the United
Kingdom, three times that of the United States or Spain.”
8. Seidman, pp. 19—20.
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Southern Europe, Kurth employs a similar device for explaining the new
configuration of forces that allowed the Greek and Italian departure from
Iberian patterns of dictatorial rule. While the U.S State Department may
well have taken a sympathetic view towards the renewal of right-author
itarian order if the Communist Party had been able to prevail at the bal
lot box (Italy, 1948) or on the battlefield (Greek civil war, 1946-49),®
parliamentarism in these two countries attained hegemony, despite fre
quent adverse assaults: in Greece during the 1950s, the existence of hun
dreds of political prisoners. Communist and otherwise, the continued
employment of police and paramilitary repression, and from 1967-74
the rise of the Colonels who predicated their usurpation on the need for
a purification and “rebirth” designed to facilitate the eventual restoration
of democracy; in Italy, the persistence of clientelism and gangrenous
growths of corruption, and in the 1970s the flourishing of extraparlia
mentary enterprises on both the far right and far left dedicated to tactics
of terror. The Italian political theorist Norberto Bobbio argued at the
time that the closed-door secrecy of the ruling Christian Democrats had
found an eerie parallel in the clandestine, antidemocratic practices of the
counterrevolutionary sects and revolutionary groupuscules:
I limit myself to the suspicion . . . that state secrecy has been used to protect
anti-state secrecy. . . . The degeneration of the Itahan system began there. . . .
One of the founders of modem terrorism, Bakunin, proclaimed the necessity
of an “invisible dictatorship.” Whoever joins a terrorist group is forced to go
underground, wear a mask, and exercise the same art of lying so often
described as one of the prince’s stratagems. He, too, scmpulously follows the
maxim that power is more effective the more he knows and sees without
being seen.*®
9. William Colby in his memoir of CIA service, Honorable Men (New York, 1978)
declares that “the very deliberate and conscious policy was made in Washington that no
help of any kind go to the Neo-Fascists or Monarchists. The unammous view was that...
the United States did not need to back right-wing groups in its campaign to stop the nse of
the Communists.” (italics mine) For a somewhat different view of U.S. cooperation with
far right and mafia elements, see Roberto Faenza and Marco Fini, G/i americani in Italia
(Milano, 1976).
For a critical view of U.S. ties to authoritarian elements in Greece, see Andreas Papandreou. Democracy at Gunpoint (New York, 1970). Of the rise of the Colonels in 1967, he
recalls:
“I asked [U.S. Ambassador Phillips] Talbot whether America could have intervened the
night of the coup, to prevent the death of democracy in Greece. He denied that they could
have done anything about it. Then Margaret [Papandreou’s wife] asked a critical question:
What if the coup had been a Communist or a Leftist coup? Talbot answered without hes
itation. Then, of course, they would have intervened, and they would have crushed the
coup.”
10. Noberto Bobbio, “Democracy and Invisible Government,” in Telos, 52, 1982, pp.
54-55. See also Robert Lumley, States of Emergency: Cultures of Revolt in Italy from 1968 to
1978 (London, 1990), p. 285.
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Indeed much journalistic and academic commentary of the late 1970s
and early 1980s still judged the prospects for democracy in Southern
Europe to be precarious, as a sampling of headlines from over a decade
ago concerning the region’s wealthiest country might attest: “Italy in
Agony” (Time), “Italy is Finished” {Der Spiegel), and “Le Chaos Italien”
(a frequent French newspaper headhne, reports Le Nouvel Ohservateur)}^
But the tide began to change. In 1983, the U.S. liberal weekly the
New Republic featured Michael Ledeen, who in an article entitled
“Craxi’s Moxie” saluted Italy’s new “sexy leader” as one who “may
somehow force the country’s politicians to come to grips with the prob
lems they have diligently avoided for the past fifteen years.
In a very
different spirit from the New Republic’s abrupt conversion to Italophilia,
Joseph LaPalombara published his Democracy Italian Style (1987), praising
the postwar Italian system for high levels of popular participation and a
political machinery that in its own way managed to articulate and
respond to pubhc needs. In a special issue devoted to Italy, France’s Nou
vel Observateur (3 May 1990) entitled its cover article, “Les miracles de
I’ltalie,” while U.S. News & World Report (18 July 1988) ran with
“Europe’s sun belt also rises: Not since the Medicis has the Mediter
ranean shown so much flare.” The U.S. media also began an upsurge of
coverage favorable to the neoliberal economic experiments in Portugal
and Spain, paradoxically under the tutelage of Socialist regimes. Again
Ledeen observed that the “selection of Craxi as Italy’s prime minister
completes the transition of Latin Europe from artereosclerotic conser
vatism to democratic sociahsm ... of a particularly realistic sort.” Refer
ring to Italy’s Craxi, Spain’s Felipe Gonzalez, and Portugal’s Mario
Soares, he declared that “In the curious world we now live in, these
three men of the left are attempting to remedy the effects of runaway
social spending programs carried out by previous governments of the
right (or center-right). And in foreign policy, these Eurosocialists are
more consistently and coherently concerned about Soviet actions than
11. The U.S., German, and French headlines of gloom are assembled in the Nouvel
Observateur, 3 May 1990.
12. Michael Ledeen, “Craxi’s Moxie,” New Republic, 5 September 1983, pp. 10-11. The
issue also contains an essay praising Gonzaiez-era Spain by Morton Kondracke. The Rea
gan foreign policy team, which later made generous use of Ledeen’s skills in engineering
the Iran-contra arms for hostages deal, may have felt a special devotion to Craxi, for reasons
suggested by Giovanni Agnelli, the president of FIAT, in an interview with Le Monde (15
June 1983). Declaring that Craxi aspired to be the Italian Helmut Schmidt, a right-wing
social democrat, Agnelli said that “Washington also appreciates him because without the
P.S.I. the missile question would not be raised.” At the time, the U.S. sought to introduce
a modernized range of nuclear Euromissiles, and the Italian Socialist Party controlled the
Defense ministry in Italy’s Cabinet. The craze for Craxi has gone into permanent retreat, as
at this moment he is threatened with the prospect ofjail should he be convicted of corrup
tion.
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were their predecessors,” among whom he may have counted Francisco
Franco with his sometimes amicable trade relations with Havana. Early
unease about Fehpe Gonzalez’s criticism of U.S. foreign policy toward
Nicaragua quickly dissipated when on a visit to Ronald Reagan in
Washington he declared otherwise. “There was, I think, no fundamental
disagreement about Central America,” the Spanish prime minister told
the American press corps.The U.S. media rewarded Gonzalez with
near unanimous commendation for marshalling support behind NATO
in a national referendum of 1986 and later for rallying a divided public
behind Operation Desert Storm, billed as Spain’s first participation in
international conflict since the defeat at the hands of U.S. imperialism in
1898. For those willing to discount Spain’s sending of the armed Blue
Division to aid Hitler on the eastern front or Spanish military forays into
Morocco during the Riff War of the 1910s and 1920s, the intervention
ist spirit of Gonzalez was hailed as sign of a new diplomatic maturity.
Not to be counted out of the celebration of new-found Iberian virtue
was Portugal. The New York Times (24 February 1984) gave latter day
Lusitania a patronizing pat of approval with an article carrying the headHne: “Women Add a Certain Pizazz to Portugal’s Politics.”
Even the electronic media thought it an auspicious moment to
acclaim Southern European life, beyond the annual news routine of
showing the Pope’s Easter greeting and the bulls running from Pam
plona. Melding together an unseemly menage of Reagan era “family val
ues,” the spirit of Bitburg, and nostalgia for Southern Europe the way it
used to be, NBC produced a mini-series starring George C. Scott on the
unknown Mussolini, which, according to Newsweek (20 May 1985) “wiU
downplay all that nasty fascist politics and concentrate on the Duce’s lov
ing relationship with his children.”
The sole exception to the Southern Euphoria concerned the govern
ment of Greece’s Andreas Papandreou. Tainted with charges of antiAmericanism (by Diane Sawyer on “Sixty Minutes” and by Henry
Kamm in a profile in the New York Times Magazine), and faulted for not
13. New York Times, 22 June 1983. For other gestures of PSOE support for Washing
ton’s foreign policy, see Thierry Maliniak, “M. Felipe Gonzalez annonce I’achat de 72
avions de combat americains,” Le Monde, 1 June 1983, and “Les socialistes espagnols multiplient les gestes de bonne volonte a I’egard des Etats-Unis,” Le Monde, 23 June 1983, the
latter of which notes that though Gonzalez continues to criticize U.S. policy in Central
America, Washington is happy because “the points of accord on the policies pursued in
Central America ‘surpass the points of discord.’’’ According to Mahniak and Diana John
stone in The Politics of Euromissiles (London, 1984), the PSOE’s ardor to please Washington
stemmed from a desire to placate the military concerning Morocco, a close ally of the U.S.
and a threat to Spain’s last outposts in North Africa, Ceuta and Melilla. Gonzalez hoped to
avoid a repetition of the abortive golpe of 23 February 1981 that sought to overthrow his
predecessor.
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dismantling state programs with the dihgence of his Eurosocialist coun
terparts, Papandreou in the end did nothing to abrogate NATO base
agreements and for good measure rebuilt a central symbol of U.S. inter
ventionism, a statue of Harry S. Truman blown up by Greek leftists in
anticipation of the arrival in Athens of U.S. Secretary of State George
Shultz. The New Republic, always wary of Papandreou for his PLO sym
pathies and anti-NATO proclamations, conceded that he
repeats the comfortable catechism of anti-Americanism while doing nothing
to harm Greece’s ties with the United States. . . . We are tempted to applaud
hypocrisy of this sort. Papandreou’s pronouncements have few practical con
sequences, and allow the United States to retain access to the Aegean. He is
preferable to someone who takes his party’s platform more literally.'''
PeTRAS’S CRITIQUE OF SOUTHERN EUROPEAN SOCIALISM

Nonetheless, during the 1970s, there emerged an alternative body of hterature, most notably that of the prolific Belgian Marxist economist
Ernest Mandel, who argued that with the coUapse of authoritarianism in
the South, left parties were squandering a propitious moment for
advancing radical political change. These works decried first Stalinism
and then the social democratization of the major European Communist
parties, the latter trend reflected in the Italian Communist Party’s coop
eration with Christian Democrat pohcies of austerity (1976-79), as well
as in the Spanish Communist Party’s neo-reformist posturings outlined
in ‘Eurocomunismo’ y Estado {Eurocommunism and the State, 1977) by its
Secretary General Santiago Carrillo.'^ While mainstream social scientists
lauded conciliation and convergence for averting the resumption of class
and civil warfare, much of the Southern European working class did not
seem eager to adapt to the revisionist ferment of the 1970s. Powerful
surges of working class strike and political unrest convulsed Southern
Europe. In Spain, for instance, the number of working hours lost
14. “Squeaky Greek at the Wheel,” New Republic, 4 February 1985, pp. 9—10. The arti
cle, nevertheless, warns: “The trouble with hypocrites is that they have a way of talking
themselves into a comer.” So they concluded that Papandreou remained a potential threat.
15. Ernest Mandel, From Stalinism to Eurocommunism (London, 1978) and Revolutionary
Marxism Today (London, 1979). For critiques of Eurocommunism from other left tradi
tions, see Carl Boggs and David Plotke, eds.. The Politics of Eurocommunism: Socialism in
Transition (Boston, 1980) The chief text of revisionism in Spain is Santiago Carrillo, ‘Euro
comunismo' y Estado (Barcelona, 1977). Carrillo placed “Eurocommunism” in quotations, as
the term was invented by anti-communist ideologues in the mid-1970s and only later
adopted by many Communists. See Philip Schlesinger, Media, State, and Nation (London,
1991), chapter six, for a history of the term and its many ideological mutations in the
1970s. For an illuminating survey of the literature on Eurocommunism in Spain, see
Patrick Camiller, “The Eclipse of Spanish Communism,” New Left Review, 147, Septem
ber/October 1984.
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through strikes hurtled from 1.5 million hours in 1965 to 8.7 million in
1970 to 14.5 million in 1975, and then to 150 million in 1976.'^ In
Greece, seven years of draconian wage restraint under the Colonels gave
way to constant pressure for redress, culminating in dramatic worker
demonstrations against high prices in Athens during May 1981. Inherit
ing the eventual electoral triumphs from those struggles were not the
Communists but rather the Sociahst parties. After an interlude of conser
vative democratic rule in Spain and Greece in the late 1970s, the Social
ists burst out of opposition, at first quite mihtant in rhetoric and, in the
eyes of much of the Western left, full of potential for achieving radical
reform. Whereas Mandel and his co-thinkers had vented frustration at
the social democratization of the Communist parties of the 1970s, Petras in
the 1980s emerged as a leading critic of the Thatcherization and neo-lib
eralization of the social democrats.'^ This great right moving theatre
show opened with several thematic innovations: Craxi of the Italian
Socialist Party put in charge of the government coalition in hopes that he
could better discipline the working class than the Christian Democrats;
and Soares of the Portuguese Socialist Party eroding agrarian reform as
well as expressing irritation at the Socialist International for supposed
over-indulgence toward the Third W^orld, for instance in the Brandt
Commission’s call for 2 percent of GNP to be transferred from North to
South, from the rich to the poorer countries of the world. Spain’s via
thatcheriana brought in its wake unemployment approaching 20 percent
amidst vandalized public services, a ravaged physical environment, and
large-scale projects designed to slake the thirst for predatory overconsumptionism among the middle and upper classes. For the old party
faithful, there was the occasional flare of marxisant rhetoric and revolu
tionary iconography on the party’s posters.
Indeed the combination of radical rhetoric and consumerist extrava
gance was on display in full baroque regaha during the 1992 Olympics.
Armed with nearly $200 million in public funds to construct apartments,
the Socialist-run city council of Barcelona had given a solemn pledge in
1986 to sell the proposed units, in words spoken by Mayor Pasqual
Maragall, at “low, competitive prices.” In 1992, the apartments were
unveiled and priced in the vicinity of well-oiled yuppiedom at $350,000
for a three-bedroom. The Olympic Village has ironically been named
“Nova Icaria” after the radical communist utopia of Etienne Cabet
16. For strike data in Spain, see Jose Maria Maravell and Julian Santamaria, “Political
Change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy,” in O’Donnell, Schimtter, and Whitehead, pp. 77 and 82.
17. Petras in his chapter on Greece and particularly Ronald Chdcote in this volume’s
essay on Portugal probably go to greater lengths than Mandel to demonstrate the class basis
and economic constraints that made the retreat from socialism a likely outcome.
10
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(1788-1856). Even Time art critic Robert Hughes, author of the best
seller Barcelona and an admirer of the project, conceded in mock-horror:
“You might as well call an upscale condo block in Berlin the Rosa Lux
emburg Tower.” Apparently unbeknownst to Hughes, on Madrid’s
nouveau chic northwest comer is the Rosa Luxemburg Estate in which
a semi-detached home fetches a price of 165,000 British pounds.'*
In the 1960s and 1970s, North American social democrats such as Irv
ing Howe and Michael Harrington suggested that the Democratic Party
of the U.S. would increasingly move toward the place on the political
spectmm occupied by Europe’s social democrats. If Petras’s analysis is on
target, European social democracy has instead brought about the Ameri
canization of the continent’s politics, featuring exclusive dominance by
capitalist parties, election techniques based on the “Brand A, Brand B”
sloganeering of the media experts and the advertising industry, and
publics whose attentions are diverted into apathetic consumerism and
mediatized spectacle.
When Petras’s critiques of the Southern European socialist parties
appeared in the mid-1980s, some judged them unduly harsh. They have
since gained a certain notoriety for prescience after the dizzying spectacle
of subsequent revelations and prosecutions piled atop a mound of coiruption already grown fetid and rotting. Even Catholic Cardinal Enrique
Tarancdn, an outspoken critic of Francoism, admits mefuUy that the theft
and brigandage under the Gonzalez regime probably exceeds the bucca
neering carried out by corsairs in the entourage of the late Generahssimo.'^
Now there are those pohtical scientists who, following the insight of Sir
Lewis Namier on Hanoverian Britain, might represent this as a sort of
progress by arguing that corruption can more easily flourish with the
decline of dangerously overheated ideological passions. Corruption “was a
mark of English freedom and independence,” thought Namier, “for no
one bribes where he can buUy.”^° Moreover, with politicians and their
enemies no longer committed to higher, transcendent values that they will
18. Robert Hughes, Barcelona (New York, 1992), p. 40. For the Madrid anecdote, and
the anti-democratic pratices of the PSOE in the building projects of the 1980s and early
1990s, John Hooper, “Fast track to the Olympics,” Guardian (UK), 13—14 June 1992.
19. “A lot of rot,” Economist, 8 February 1992. The correspondent concludes that the
charges of the respected Tarancon may be hard to prove. “Socialists,” according to The
Economist, “tend to argue that the exposure of scandal is a sign of health. In the past, they
say, the press and the courts were timid.” The Economist adds in response: “This cheering
argument would be stronger were Spain’s judiciary more independent. . . . The snag is that
in 1982 the improbable happened. The Socialists won an outright majority in parliament
and with it unchallenged control of the judiciary committee. Spain’s judges still depend too
much on political masters.” In the elections of 1993, the Socialists won, but lost their
majority control.
20. Lewis Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution (London, 1970 [1930]),
p. 4.
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fight to the death to defend, conflicts can be resolved without the threat of
class or civil war. Britain’s immediate postwar foreign secretary Ernest
Bevin had indeed thought it futile to fund the Spanish opposition to Fran
co because for him it only risked a new round of calamity and bloodshed.^'
But given such misrule and malfeasance among the Socialists, there are
questions of how they have been able to sustain their rule. Admittedly
the Greek electorate voted Papandreou out of office, albeit narrowly,
and Gonzalez barely escaped defeat in the elections of 1993. In Italy,
investigation into scandal in Milan has effectively decapitated the Social
ists, while the ensuing crisis now threatens the rest of the Itahan pohtical
class. The Sociahsts in Italy talk about dismanthng their party and form
ing a brand new organization made up of reformist PSI remnants and
flotsam and jetsam from parties of the political center. Should they sur
vive, the Socialists must also worry about desertion from women voters
who, after gliding substantially leftward during the feminist mobihzation
of 1968-1976, express continued disenchantment with the party’s abom
inable record of inclusion: in the Chamber of Deputies elected in 1983,
only 1 out of 73 PSI deputies were women, compared to 38 out of 198
for the PCI and 6 out of 255 for the DC.^^ Despite such festering prob
lems, the political success of the Socialists in the overall region has had
tangible sources. In sociological terms, late industrialization in Southern
Europe had by the 1970s produced the social bases conducive to social
democratization.^^ The class structure now vaguely resembled that of
Northern Europe during the breakthrough period for social democracy
spanning from the interwar period in the Scandinavian countries to 1945
in the United Kingdom. Only in the case of Southern Europe, postmod
ern elements possessed a much heavier weight in the social structure than
that of the North circa the early postwar era (see Kurth, pp. 52—53). Per21. Of course, such high-minded concerns did not deter British intelligence from help
ing Greek rightists during the civil war or the American CIA from funneHng resources to
the Christian Democrats in Italy in the 1940s and to the Portuguese Socialists in the 1970s
when the alternative might be the triumph of a hard-line left. For a discussion of Bevin’s
dilemmas, see Raymond Carr, “How Franco Made It,” New York Review of Books, 4 Feb
ruary, 1988. On CIA support for the Portuguese Socialists, Maxwell, p. 130.
22. Donald Sassoon, Contemporary Italy (New York, 1986), p. 107. Overall the proporton of women in the lower house of national parhaments in Western Europe during 1990
ranges from a high of 38.1 percent in Sweden to a low of 5.3 percent in Greece. Spain with
13.4 percent and Italy with 12.9 percent lie just below the European median, Portugal
with 7.6 percent occupies the basement with the United Kingdom (6.3), France (5.7), and
Greece (5.3). Data from Hege Skjeie, “The Uneven Advance of Norwegian Women,”
New Left Review, 187, May/June, 1991, p. 94. For background on women in southern
European politics, see Sassoon on Italy, Eleni Stamiris, “The Women’s Movement in
Greece,” New Left Review, 158, July/August 1986 and Monica Threlfall, “The Women’s
Movement in Spain,” New Left Review, 151, May/June 1985.
23. The discussion that follows owes much to the concluding chapter of Perry Ander
son, English Questions (London, 1992).
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haps relatedly, the South’s social democratic parties lacked the same
organic links with the labor movement as their northern counterparts,
reflected in weaker levels of unionization (with the exception of Italy,
typically only 20 percent of the workforce compared to 60-80 percent in
Sweden and Austria) and a less active presence in resisting the dictator
ships in Spain, Portugal, and Greece than their main rivals on the left, the
communist parties. Thus they reached those growing segments of the
new middle class who appear content to vote Socialist rather than partic
ipate in unions. Heavily weighted toward white coUar managers, teach
ers, doctors, lawyers, state bureaucrats, and scientific and technical work
ers, the Socialists increasingly grounded their appeal on three yardsticks:
1) efficiency, 2) advance of civil liberties, and 3) modernization.
By all three measures, the Socialists have begun to lose legitimacy and
good will, but in Greece, Portugal, and Spain they retain a substantial
minority of the electorate. First, on the subject of efficiency, there is a
pessimistic sense among the electorate that all parties partake in corrup
tion, and in the case of Greece, as Petras suggests, Papandreou was sup
ported at the polls by many who felt for the first time that they had been
given access to goodies from the patrimonial state.In Spain, despite the
preponderance of Socialist scandal, officials from the People’s Party (the
main party of the conservative opposition) also carry with them the stale
aroma of corruption, in particular indictments for taking bribes for giv
ing support in local councils to a variety of building projects. In Italy, all
of the major parties, including the former PCI, long sailed gracefully
upon rivers of corruption and patronage. (However, in contrast to Spain
where a government poU at the end of 1992 indicates that only 2 percent
regard it as the nation’s top problem, recent Italian developments indi
cate a public more determined that the political swamp be drained of
such rampant thievery. The post-Cold War epoch by easing middle class
anxieties about Communist triumph has thus eroded support for patron
age networks at one time thought necessary to choke off the PCI.)^^
Second, the advances of civil liberties under the Socialists have helped
remove the terror and trauma lingering from the reign of the Colonels,
Salazar, and Franco. “Andreas took away the fear” is how one Greek
peasant woman expressed her support for Papandreou.^® Greek voters
respond favorably to PASOK’s populist attacks against U.S. support for
24. Angered by austerity and charges of corruption against the right and their Prime
Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, the Greek electorate appears likely to propel Papandreou
back to power in national elections slated for October 1993.
25. Spanish poU cited by John Hooper, “Spain’s pride turns to shame,” Guardian (UK),
8 March 1993.
26. Oral interview with Dennis Skiotis, historian of modem Greece, Harvard Universi
ty, summer 1991.
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the authoritarianism of the Colonels and the regime in Turkey. There is
a widespread sense of gratitude to the Socialists in the domain of civil hberties, despite occasional abuses which in Spain today include continued
police torture of Gypsies and suspected supporters of the ETA, steppedup crackdowns on Arab immigrants, and now Gonzalez’s move to clamp
restrictions on the right to strike, the last one ironic because as a young
lawyer he fought to wrest this privilege from the Francoist apparatchiks.
Third and finally, the Socialist parties have associated themselves with
modernization and all that seems positive in this word. Mitterrand of
France with the slogan of “changer la vie” and pursuit of colossal pro
jects of hyper-modernity (the TGV, the Louvre pyramid, the Tolbiac
library. La Defense) is the pacesetter in this regard, but the Spanish, Por
tuguese, and Greek socialists have all combined the slogan of change
(“cambi’o” and “allaghi”) with ambitious state plans for modernized
infrastructure. This is where they break from Thatcher, who relied more
on private capital than the state for such enterprises. In the United States,
Clinton in his triumph over the Republicans similarly unified the slogan
of “change” with emphasis on infrastructure, muting the stress on social
justice and welfare that alienates middle class publics safely bunkered in
suburbia and hostile to what might loosely be caUed a politics of compas
sion. Despite Clinton’s and the Socialists’ vast discharge of rhetorical
vapor on the need to improve public transit, the infusion of infrastruc
tural spending favors the automobile complex, as Gonziez, for instance,
spends almost five times more on highways over rail.^’ Many regions still
experience grindingly atrocious, nineteenth-century rail service. That,
however, is not what is noticed in the mediatized society of the spectacle
mastered so brilliantly by the Socialists.
As rickety, dilapidated buildings are bulldozed away m favor of a
Marks and Spencer in Lisbon, as potholed goat trails give way to mod
ernized thoroughfares in Salonika, as 21st-century bullet trains link
Madrid with Gonzalez’s hometown of Seville and tracks blocking access
to the coast in Barcelona are placed underground and reveal six new
shimmering beaches, those who speak out against the pollution, the con
gestion, and the overdevelopment in the worst of these projects are
scorned as neo-Puritans holding Southern Europe back from its appoint
ed destiny of attaining relative equality with the wealthier nations of the
European Community.^* “In Spain,” writes the Economist (25 April
27. “Spain; Mitteleuropa on the Med” (A Survey), Economist, 25 Apnl 1992, P- 828. Opponents of the SeviUe buUet train often use the Sociahsts’ own Euro-rhetonc in
denouncing the project. Rather than link Spain with France, they say it allegedly leads
Spain backward to the south. Spanish television also found it worthy of mild ndicule. in
the early days of the TGV, they enjoyed showing clips of empty passenger cars. A more
sinister charge emerged in early 1993 when, as John Hooper reports, “the German multi14
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1992), ‘“the right’ is associated with the fascist past, ‘the left’ with
progress.” Among the left constituency in Southern Europe, there may
be a certain parallel with the findings of Peter Winn in his classic study of
the Chilean working class. Weavers of Revolution (1986). Winn argued that
compared to their parents’ generation the younger working class genera
tion exhibited both (1) a greater pohtical militancy, due to new forms of
community and their formation in the midst of sixties protest movements
and new left intellectual currents, and (2) a greater attraction to consumer
afiluence partly as a result of exposure to the new media and music cul
ture. Whereas the movements associated with the Unidad Popular of
Allende had channeled these new energies and aspirations toward the
first, the struggle for social justice, the converse occurred in Southern
Europe, where the Socialists decided to put the stress on the second: the
new materialism and consumerism. They saw themselves appealing to
those Jean-Luc Godard had christened “the children of Marx and CocaCola.” As a favorite chant of libertarian-left activists in Italy during the
1970s would have it, in an inversion of the Leninist slogan “. . . all power
to the soviets”: “Free radios are a provocation — all power to the televi
sion!” (“Le radio libere sono provocazione — tutto il potere alia televisione.”)^'^
The golden age of the Latin and Hellenic Socialist parties is over: Mit
terrand, ailing and aging, suffered one of the most resounding political
defeats in modem French history during the parliamentary elections of
1993; Soares, the president of Portugal, has cohabited with the dominant
center-right Social Democrats whose leader Cavaco Silva holds the post
of prime minister; and Craxi of Italy, Gonzalez of Spain, and Papandreou
of Greece all carry pockmarks from a politics of pistonnage weU-greased
by graft and payola. There are, however, two potentially contradictory
forces that may allow for at least partial survival of Socialist power: (1)
the politics of integration and (2) voter realignment from regionalist and
separatist movements.^® It is apparent that the recent history of the
world’s advanced industrial nations has been one of domination by connational Siemens [had] handed over several million pounds to three firms run by former
officials in the Socialist party and government. The payments were for services in connec
tion with Spain’s first high-speed train link . . . Siemens, which headed a consortium
awarded a 440 miUion pound contract, said the payments were for ‘technical and commer
cial advice.’” A High Court judge has discovered a network of PSOE-linked firms with
what Hooper describes as “skeleton staffs” who from the end of 1989 to the end of 1990
billed Spain’s ten largest companies and banks 4.4 million pounds for consulting. When the
judge asked to see the studies said to cost as much as 500,000 pounds, the firms claimed the
reports had been (conveniently) misplaced or destroyed. Guardian (UK) 8 March 1993.
29. Lumley, p. 303.
30. Incidentally, many of the regionalist and separatist movements do not regard integra
tion and regional autonomy as contradictory. The Italian Leagues employ the slogan:
“Away from Rome, closer to Europe.” Carlo Ruzza and Oliver Schmidtke, “The Making
of the Lombard League,” Telos, 90, Winter 1991—92, p. 69.
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servative parties, at least at the presidential or prime ministerial level:
Japan, Germany, Great Britain, the U.S., and Italy. Spain may represent
a successful break from this pattern. This development has been rein
forced by integration and regionalism: first, at the level of integration,
the Socialists have proven adept at gaining EC resources for the so-called
poor four (Spain, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal), which has been further
facilitated by the Sociahst leadership of the EC in the person ofJacques
Delors. Until recent charges of corruption squelched enthusiasm for his
candidacy, Felipe Gonzalez was himself long rumored to be the frontnmner to succeed Delors at the EC helm. Now there remain consider
able obstacles to future EC benificence toward the South, the new Ger
man insularity and Spain’s own advancing wealth. Of the last, some
economists believe that if Spain s substantial underground economy
were to undergo proper calculation, the nation would have surpassed the
90 percent of per capita EC GNP used as an aid threshhold as weU as the
standard of living in the United Kingdom. These gains face erosion in
the current recession, with job lay-offs and galloping inflation bringing
new threats of a major labor offensive against the EC’s single market:
witness the general strike of 28 May 1992 in Spain that shut hundreds of
factories, and the rallies and near riots of 2 October 1992 in Rome
against the austerity package of Italy’s Socialist Prime Minister Giuhano
Amato.
StiU there remains a sense in Spain and elsewhere among middle-class
publics that the Socialist technocrats can best deliver the goods from
their Eurocrat counterparts in Brussels. It is such considerations that pro
voke Denis MacShane’s observation that the “Spanish Socialists are the
most Eurofanatic of the Continental left.’’^' In Greece, with the largest
proportion of self-employed petty bourgeoisie in the EC, there are out
breaks of anti-Brussels protests based on the efforts to terminate state
31. Denis MacShane, “The Pain in Spain,” New Statesman and Society, 1 May 1992. Atti
tudes among different middle classes within EC nations have many variations. In Italy and
Spain, EC integration is sometimes hailed for imposing austerity on what are seen as irre
sponsible and spendthrift governments, and in Greece there is the occasional joke that after
400 years of Ottoman rule from Constantinople, it may be time to submit to Brussels.
Contrary to the view that the EC fosters austerity, others believe that Papandreou did not
feel uncomfortable with huge deficits because he ultimately thought that the EC could bail
his government out of a crisis. In the meantime, the petty bourgeoisie of Greece continues
to exhibit opposition to the EC, as political scientist Nikiforos Diamandouros remarks:
“The self-employed small timers - and there is a greater percentage of them than anywhere
else in the EC - are deeply opposed to further integration in Europe. . . . They see the
opening of borders as a threat to the country’s national identity and are fearful of its conse
quences, because it will necessitate a clampdown on excessive state protectionism.” Dia
mandouros, quoted by Helena Smith, “Crossroads of East and West,” Guardian (UK) 26
November 1990.
16

PREFACE: SOUTHERN EUROPE - PAST AND PRESENT

subsidies and fear of German multinational corporations overwhelming
small fiy enterprises (over 85 percent of all manufacturing enterprises in
Greece had less than ten employees in 1984).^^ Even here, however, fear
of Turkey recuperates substantial support for a pohtics of European inte
gration.
Second, regionalist and separatist movements at times may leave the
Socialists as their greatest beneficiary. Simply stated, the regionalist
movements have tended to divert votes from the national conservative
parties, thus damaging prospects for a right resurrection. To resume
again with Spain, the conservative People’s Party runs close to the
Socialists in most regions of Spain, but its popularity drops off dramati
cally to single figures in Catalonia and the Basque country where nor
mally right-leaning voters puU the lever for Jordi Pujol’s Catalan nation
alists and Xabier Arzallus’s Basque Nationalists. The millions of votes
siphoned from the conservative forces allow for continued Sociahst tri
umphs. Contrary to some theories that suggest ethnic separatism is based
on internal colonization and economic deprivation, Catalonia and the
Basque country are generally wealthier than most of Spain and, in ordi
nary circumstances, would not appear to be a natural constituency for
“left of center” parties. The Spanish right’s association with Franco’s
assaults against regional identity is a legacy that will continue to harm
conservative prospects for recapturing control of the Spanish Cortes. In
Italy, the two pillars of postwar order have been the ruling Christian
Democrats and the opposition Communist Party. With the rise of the
Leagues, which employ such slogans of slashing self-ridicule as “Pay, you
Lombard jackass” to object to the Christian Democrat tradition of drain
ing resources from the North to the underdeveloped South, this may
wreak havoc with the traditional DC plurality in parliament. Unlike
Spain, however, the Socialists squandered whatever opportunity they
had to overtake the DC as the main governing party. Gianfranco Migho,
the grand theoretician of the Lega Nord, observes that the Leagues possess
the same social base as the DC: “workers, artisans, businessmen, small
and medium entrepreneurs, professionals, teachers, intellectuals, and
many young people,” who are “breaking with the Catholic party as a
result of growing secularization.” As it declines in the North, the DC, he
predicted in 1991, “will consolidate its role as the leading party in Cen
tral and Southern Italy. . . . The Socialists, who continue to receive sup
port in all Italian provinces, could become the typical federal party, i.e.,
a party which, because of its ideological orientation, takes responsibility
for safeguarding solidarity between the various Italies.” The latter has not
32. Data from Rinn S. Shinn, ed., Greece: A Country Study (Washington, 1986), p. 180.
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been borne out by subsequent developments: the Socialists have fallen
into even greater disgrace than the heavily tarnished DC in the ongoing
corruption scandal. Moreover, the PCI’s transformation into the PDS, a
kind of hybrid social democratic party, has allowed them to hold on to
voters who in the rest of Southern Europe would probably have drifted
toward the Socialist parties. Italy’s divergent pattern owes much to the
long entrenched social democratization of its main communist party: in
Greece, Portugal, and Spain, the Communist parties have kept more of
their Stahnized structures intact. In some sense, therefore, Miglio’s con
clusion about the trajectory of the left parties in Italy has been almost
vindicated (despite his failure to forecast the impending implosion of the
PSI): “It is highly unlikely that the supporters of the former Communist
Party and other smaller parties, which also draw support from all parts of
the country, could do anything other than complement the Socialist
Party.It could take years before the latest and greatest of quagmires in
postwar Itahan politics leads toward resolution.^**
Already the global recession and renewed despair about the region’s
political class has plunged Southern Europe into an age of uncertainty.
The triumphalist, celebratory literature about the achievements of
progress in Southern Europe has given way to renewed cadences of
Europessimism and songs of retreat.
Southern Europe continues to live in the shadow of two pervasive
images. The first is cast from the distant past: the legacies of antiquity and
the Renaissance, epochs said to resound with triumph and glory. Samuel
Johnson claimed that “Almost all our religion, almost all our law, almost
all the arts, almost aU that sets us above savages, has come to us from the
Mediterranean.’’^^ Italian civic humanism from Bruni to MachiaveUi
regarded classical antiquity as the lodestar to national regeneration, while
in Portugal its literary vanguard, Camoes (1525—1580), Vieira
33. Gianfranco Miglio, “Towards a Federal Italy,” Telos, 90, Winter 1991—92, p. 22.
Milan’s continued investigation into the alleged corruption of Bettino Craxi and the
abysmal Socialist performance in the Italian elections of 13 and 14 December 1992 involv
ing 55 coitununes and approximately 1 million voters indicates a much more rocky future
for the PSI than anticipated by Miglio. Compared to the April 1992 general elections, the
Socialists lost 3.6 percent of their support, the Christian Democrats, 4.8 percent, while the
ex-Communist Democratic Party of the Left sHd only 1.9 percent. Meanwhile, the North
ern League posted a 3.4 percent leap, along with gains for the anti-Mafia Network (+2.7
percent) and the neo-fascist Itahan Social Movement (+1.7 percent). “A plague on the par
ties,” Economist, 19—25 December 1992.
34. For a pessimistic view of the reform referendum of April 1993, see Tobias Abse,
“The Triumph of the Leopard,” New Left Review, 199, May/June 1993.
35. Samuel Johnson quoted by James Boswell in George Birkbeck Hill, ed., Boswell's Ufe
ofJohnson (vol. Ill, Life 1776-1780), (New York, 1921 reprint ed.), p. 42.
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(1608—1697), Garrett (1799—1854), E^a de Queiroz (1845—1900), and
Pessoa (1888—1935), instead rejoiced in the fifteenth century as the pin
nacle of human achievement. As the Jesuit Vieira proclaimed in his
Historia do Futuro: “In those happy times . . . nothing was read of in the
World except the navigations and conquests of Portuguese. That history
was the silence of aU [other] histories. Enemies read in it their ruin, rivals
their envy and only Portugal its glory.
Nevertheless, there is another image of Southern Europe that fingers
from the more recent past. That is, the view of Southern Europe as a
region mired in banditry, backwardness, and barbarity. Northern Euro
peans look upon modem Southern Europeans with disappointment for
somehow not resembling the classical philosopher-kings or Periclean and
Ciceronian statesmen so celebrated in the pubhc schools and Gymnasi
um. The great Russian poet Pushkin called the modern Greeks “the
legal heir of Homer and Themistocles”; but when he finally got around
to meeting members of the Greek merchant class he declared their land
“a nasty people of bandits and shopkeepers.” Churchill labeled the ELAS
forces “miserable Greek banditti” and “the most treacherous filthy
beasts.” A British officer during World War II judged the Italians a “peo
ple who live in squalor and have made a mess of their country, their
administration and their lives.
In the postwar period, the most acute
ly felt episode of derision likely surrounds Lyndon Johnson’s rebuke of
Greek ambassador Alexander Matsas:
America is an elephant, Cypms is a flea. Greece is a flea. If these two fellows
continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant’s
trunk, whacked good. . .

In response to this longstanding humiliation. Southern Europe has
picked up the gauntlet of progress, part of a dash toward Europe so
urgent that its leaders seem ready to forsake past loyalties and solidarities.
Despite itself spending nearly 1.5 billion ECU on development and
humanitarian aid to Latin America from 1976-1989, the European
Community has called on Spain and Portugal to terminate their special
36. Vieira quoted by Ronald W. Sousa, The Rediscoverers: Major Writers in the Portuguese
Literature of National Regeneration (University Park and London, 1981), p. 74. In particular,
Camoes’s Os Lusiadas, the national epic of Portugal, was a standard text in the school cur
riculum, especially under Salazar.
37. Pushkin and Churchill quoted by Clogg, pp. 55 and 149. British officer quoted by
Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988 (London,
1990), p. 1.
38. LBJ quoted by Christopher Hitchens, Cyprus (London, 1984), p. 61. His speech
began with a few choice expletives about the Greek parliament and Constitution. He
added for good measure, “Don’t forget to tell old Papa-what’s-his name what I told you —
you hear?,” a reference to then Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou.
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relationships and immigration privileges for Latin America.Some of
the new policy is designed to placate the least savory poHtical elements,
notably the leader of France’s Front National Jean-Marie Le Pen, who in
wilder moments of oratory alleges that Paris’s main refuge for prostitu
tion, the Bois de Boulogne, is filled with Brazilians because of Portugal’s
laxity in enforcing immigration restrictions.'*®
It is the politics of race and European identity that have reared what
appears to be an increasingly ugly head. Snarling barbarism redolent of
the interwar years is once again ascendant. For the discontents of moder
nity, the idea of progress carries a very different meaning from that of the
sober technocrats of the EC, and for many Europeans, northern and
southern, this means the resumption of the cold war in the longer and
original definition of the term. In the fourteenth century, the Spaniard
Don Juan Manuel coined the couplet “cold war” to refer to the perma
nent struggle against the Arab.'*' As Southern Europe now stands at the
front line of the continent’s boundaries, the pressure mounts to expel the
rising Arab and Third World presence in the Iberian peninsula and
beyond. Such developments starve and imperil further growth of a
democratic politics in Western Europe.
Creeping repression, wedded to an economics of Thatcherism, is not
likely to augur well for the future. Petras’s essays give jarring testimony
to the poHtical decay and depredations of the market in Southern Europe
39. For data on EC aid to Latin America, see the EC booklet The European Community
and Latin America (Brussels, 1991). This does not include the substantial European contri
butions to Catholic programs in Latin America; see “Trente ans en Amerique latine: Rap
port de I’Aide a I’Eglise en Detresse 1962-1992,” Aide d I’Eglise en Detresse Bulletin (Bel
gium), no. 6, September 1992.
40. In Spain, the recent murder of Lucrecia Perez, a black woman from the Dominican
Repubhc, has called attention to the rise in hate crimes against Third World peoples. “Un
guardia civil y jovenes nazis, acusados de dos crimenes racistas: ocho detenidos por los
asesinatos de inmigrantes en Madrid,” El Pals (edicion intemacional/weekly), 30 Novem
ber, 1992. In the same edition, see their special feature “La crisis de los refugiados: La
invasion que hace temblar a Europa.” Kingjuan Carlos in his annual mensaje de Nochebuena
has condemned the rise of xenophobic violence. See “El Rey llama a la solidaridad y condena ‘los malos vientos de xenofobia’ que soplan en Europa,” El Pals (edicion internacional/weekly), 28 December 1992.
Italy, which sent 26 million Italians abroad between 1861 and 1973 (with less than 25
percent permanently returning), became a net importer of labor in the 1970s for the first
time in the modem epoch. Labor from the Philippines, Egypt, and the Horn of Africa have
emerged as targets of anti-immigrant ideologues. For data on immigration and emigration
flows, see Sassoon, p. 98.
41. For discussions of the origin of the term cold war, see Fred HaUiday, The Making of
the Second Cold War (London, 1986), p. 5, and his article, “Spanish customs,” New States
man and Society, 15 Febraary 1991. For the latest on repression of Arabs, including the prac
tices of “a beefed-up Spanish Customs Service that is now being advised by the U.S. Bor
der Patrol,” John Ross, “Quincentennial Deja-Vu - Spain Expels Arabs All Over Again,”
Z Magazine, October 1992.
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well underway in the 1980s. The ongoing investigation of corruption in
Italy has disgraced the pohtical class and led to calls for wholesale privati
zation, often by “reformist” Sociahsts who propose a fire sale of national
assets in desperate hopes of retaining power. And yet, Diarmuid
Maguire’s guarded but positive balance sheet on the postwar achieve
ments of Italian democracy and James Kurth’s conclusion may suggest
other possibilities. In Eastern and Central Europe, economic advisors
hail Anglo-American traditions of laissez-faire and free markets as the
only alternative to the torpor of decades of state socialist management
and misrule. However, in the face of negative growth rates and explosive
levels of unemployment, the beleagured denizens of the regions are
beginning to echo that query of a backbench Tory MP during the first
Thatcher recession: “We were supposed to see the economy rise hke the
phoenix from the ashes. Well, we’ve got the ashes all right. Now
where’s the bloody phoenix?”'*^ They are therefore increasingly open to
other visions of political economy. For instance, Italy’s earlier postwar
success, craftily mixing state supported enterprise with a measure of pro
tectionism, has attracted followers in Hungary who admire its prospects
for the revival of the region’s frozen economies.'*^ In such an event.
Southern Europe might no longer be thought of as a backward zone that
simply follows the lead of the wealthy north. For in spite of rampant
clientelism, and the persistence of Lombard opulence and squalor in the
Mezzogiomo, the Italian model may yet undergo resurrection. Among
its partisans, the postwar economic miracle repudiates Anglo-American
orthodoxies about the market as the sole arbiter of progress and, in that
extraordinary phrase of Francis Fukuyama, as the end of history.
42. Quoted by Simon Hoggart in Observer Sunday, 16 February 1992.
43. For a critical look at the Italian model and Hungary, see Erik Izraelewicz, “La Hongrie, un ‘capitalisme du goulasch,’” Le Monde, 28 July 1992. “Hungary looks instead for its
model in Europe,” writes Le Monde, “between Italy and Austria.” Sarolta Bartucz, who
advises the government on enterprises in the public sector, discusses a holding company
that could orchestrate state planning and investment, what she calls “a type of Italian IRI
[Istituto per La Recostruzione Industriale].” Opponents on the right worry that it will cre
ate “a vast industrial public sector that is non-competitive,” observes Le Monde] the left
fears that the Italian model may prove compatible with a Hungarian Mezzogiomo: there
exist massive inequalities between the relatively well off Budapest and Transdanubian
regions on the one hand and the impoverished southeast and northeast on the other. For a
critique of the common view that Eastern Europe is undergoing a transition to capitalism,
see Simon Clarke, “Privatization and the Development of Capitalism in Russia,” New Left
Review, 196, November/December, 1992. As for the recent lacklustre performance of the
IRI, see Robert Graham and Haig Simonian, “A Behemoth goes to the block,” Financial
Times, 15 June 1993.
44. In fairness to Fukuyama, he argues that the so-called mixed economies of Scandi
navia fit within his model of nations that have achieved the end of history. It is the more
extreme champions of anti-communism and the virtues of fi*ee markets who have claimed
the end of history for undiluted neoliberalism.
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Concerning the Italian model, a combination of a patnmomd state wth a imxed market
capitalist economy, there is skepticism that a similar “miracle of the 1950s and 960
could be repeated in the late capitalist 1990s. The relatively closed economies of the 1950
stand in sharp contrast to the transnational enterpnse and extraordinary mobility of capital
that characterize the capitalist social order of the 1990s. Capital today is better equipped to
flee and elude a political and economic order willing to grant patnmomal coatings of pro
tection to domestic industries and labor.
,1,
Still it should not be forgotten that Italy’s industnal and pohtical leadership in the after
math of WWII, though often quite cooperative with U.S. policymakers, created “Oonalized corporations such as petroleum mavenck ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarbun - 1953)
in the face of active howls of protest from Standard Oil, the State Department, and the
U.S. media elite. Secretary of State John Foster DuUes warned Italy s President Giovan^m
Gronchi, a representative of the “social” wing of the DC, that the U.S. did
oreign aid to allow nationalized enterprises to compete with the U.S. oil giants. The leader
of ENI Enrico Mattei, had previously reminded Italians that discovenng petroleum at
Caviaga in 1946 and later at Cortemaggiore “were the first rays of hope m the otherwise
bleak panorama of the Italian economy. For the first time m its history, our country has
found that it is not condemned to poverty, as has been predicted for ““yjeaR. A* ENI
spread its operations from Italy to Morocco to Libya, C.L. Sulzberger of the Nw York
Times scorned Mattei as a “condotierre,” a mercenary in the pay of Powerful pnnces. See
Harvey O’Connor, World Crisis in Oil (New York, 1962), pp. 392-3^, Paul F^nkel,
Mattei, Oil and Power Politics (New York, 1966), and Daniel Yergin We Pnze (New
York 1991) the last which treats the mysterious plane crash that killed Mattel in late
1962.’ The p’ost-Mattei ENI probably did not fiilfiU its early promise as politicians, most
notoriously Craxi, later converted it into a milk cow for themselves and their poEtical
aUies. By the mid-1970s, Italy’s three largest corporations m volume of production had
the state as owner or part-owner: the industrial group IRl, followed by ENI, “^ben
chemical group Montedison, Sassoon, p. 140. For a cnticd analysis of ENI and IRI, see
Harvey B. Feigenbaum, The Politics of Public Enterpnse: Oil and the French State (Pnnceton,
1985) Chapter 5 which is titled “Public Enterprise in Comparative Perspecnve.
For’ perspective on the magnitude of Lombard opulence and Po-rty in the Mezzo
giomo, see Sassoon, p. 214. He publishes data from the Financial Times (13 July 1981) on
inequahty throughout the Italian peninsula. If 100 is the median for per capita GNP for
Italy as a whole, VaUe d’Aosta (157) and Lombardy (133.2) rank one and two respecuvely
out of twenty regions, while Campania (64.8) and Calabna (53.1) stand at the bottom.
According to data for 1990, the Economist (26 June 1993) reports little chmge in these
grim figures, although Lombardy has overtaken Valle d’Aosta as national leader m per
capita GNP.
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APPENDIX A: A Note
Composition
Structure

of

on Politics and the
Southern European Social

Charting the components of the social structure of these four nations is
sometimes rendered dilHcult by the dearth of detailed sociological data
available elsewhere, as Martin Blinkhorn points out in his essay, “The
Iberian States,” in Detlef Miihlberger, The Social Basis of European Fascist
Movements (London, 1987). Nevertheless, the work of P. Sylos Labini,
Saggio suite classi sociali (1974) on interwar Italy demonstrates how its
major social groupings diverged substantially from northern European
countries such as Great Britain and Germany:
The

major social groupings in

Italy,

1921-36

(By

percentage)

1921

1936

1.7
1.7

1.6
1.6

White-coUar petty bourgeoisie
Independent rural petty bourgeoisie
Independent urban petty bourgeoisie
Other petty-bourgeois elements
Subtotal

3.2
37.0
10.3
2.8
53.3

5.0
35.6
11.5
2.7
54.8

Wage-earning agricultural workers
Wage-earning industrial workers
Others
Subtotal

21.8
19.6
3.6
45.0

16.2
21.4
6.0
43.6

Haute bourgeoisie (upper class)
Subtotal

TOTAL (percentage)

100

100

P. Sylos Labini table reproduced in Miihlberger, p. 7.
As for Greece, its social immobility is most starkly indicated by data
comparing nearly six decades from 1861-1920. The sectoral distribution
of the population remained nearly frozen.
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Composition of Economcally Active Population
(percentages)
1861

1920

Agriculture

74.0

70.0

Industry and Handicrafts

10.0

13.1

Commerce and Transport

6.1

9.2

Pubhc Administration

4.4

2.0

Professional and Other

5.5

4.8

Source: A.F. Freris, The Greek Economy in the Twentieth Century (London,

1986), p. 36.
Marco Revelli, in his chapter on Italy in the Muhlberger volume cited
above, points out that Germany and Great Britain had a vast decline in
workers from the traditional middle classes including both urban and
rural petty bourgeoisie, elements replaced by “a new class of white-col
lar workers integrated into the technological structure of modem com
panies.” Comparing Thomas Geiger’s data on Weimar Germany where
the traditional middle class stood at 34 percent of the population to those
of Italy, with a figure exceeding 53 percent, Revelli notes that these
“obsolete” elements of the Itahan middle class had a very substantial mral
component. “If to this we add the fact that the bulk of the proletariat was
made up of wage-earning agricultural workers (21.8 percent as com
pared with 19.6 percent of wage-earning industrial workers), he con
cludes, “we gain some idea of the enormous pockets of social immobihty and’resistance to change which existed in Italy, an expression of eco
nomic practices and life-styles which were in many respects antagonistic
to the basic demands for rationalisation exerted by the new industrial
processes and bound to react radically to the threats being posed to the
social status quo.” Whether mral and urban petty bourgeois resistance to
rationalization is the locomotive of political reaction remains a subject of
controversy; see Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler? (Princeton,
1982). Hans Speier in German White-Collar Workers and the Rise of Hitler
(New Haven, 1986) indicates that the supposedly progressive new mid
dle class was in reahty a significant source of German poHtical reaction, as
the vast majority embraced ferocious anti-Semitism, strident nationahsm,
strong opposition to trade unions, and general contempt for blue collar
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workers and Weimar democracy. For Latin America, James Petras in his
Politics and Social Structure in Latin America (New York, 1970), particular
ly part 1, attacks U.S. social science and State Department planners for
their faith in the new middle class as the vanguard of social progress. For
an incisive critique of the common association of the rural with reaction,
see Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (New York, 1973).
As for postwar Italy, Donald Sassoon in Contemporary Italy (New York,
1986) discusses the debates over P. Sylos Labini’s data and traces the
transformation to a more postmodern social structure in the present.
Three scholarly interventions on the subject of Italian social structure
include the following: Antonio Chiesi, “Alcune note suUa distribuzione
dei redditi e la struttura di classe in Italia nel periodo postbellico,”
Quademi di Sociologia, vol. 24, no. 3, 1975, Carlo Trigilia, “Sviluppo, sottosvOuppo e class! sociah in italia,” Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia, vol. 17,
no. 2, 1976, and Paolo Ammassari, Classi e ceti nella societd italiana (Turin,
1977). The last work decries the absence prior to 1968 of serious socio
logical inquiry into Italian social structure.
Turning to the Iberian peninsula in the interwar years, Bhnkhom sug
gests that the right-authoritarian politics of Spain and Portugal did not
take the radical fascist turn of Italy for several reasons: (1) weaker pres
sures from industrialization; (2) the absence of dislocation and political
upheaval from World War I because of Iberian non-participation in the
conflict; (3) regional hostility to Spanish nationalism in Catalonia, the
Basque country, and Valencia that channeled much urban petty bour
geois support toward anti-centralist, pro-democratic movements and
parties (i.e, left-wing Catalanismo, the Basque Nationalist Party, and the
Autonomous Republican Party dominant in Valencia); and (4) right
social Catholicism in small-town Castile, Leon, and Aragon that
remained suspicious of anti-Church radicals in the fascist Falange. As
Bhnkhom concludes, “The effective conquest of Spanish society’s mid
dling layers by, variously, demo-repubhcanism, regional nationalism and
social Catholicism made unlikely the appearance of an autonomous fas
cist movement during the early 1920s, and was to create serious prob
lems for those that did eventually emerge in the 1930s.” (p. 325) Ray
mond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy
(London, 1981) show how Franco had to exercise a sometimes delicate
balancing act among the different “families” supportive of his regime;
(the institutional families) the Falange, the Church, the army, as well as
(the political families) the integral Francoists, the monarchists, the tech
nocrats and the professionals.
Bhnkhorn’s portrayal of a social base, riddled with ideological fissures
and regional loyalties, can be regarded as a premonition of why the
25

Spanish state seemed less destined to evolve into a totalitarianism on the
scale of Mussohni’s fascist order.
For more on Portugal, consult Blinkhorn, and for Greece, see the
individual works of Mouzelis, Freris, Clogg, and Stavrianos cited above.
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